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ABSTRACT. Though covenants are usually considered the private sector's alternative to zon-
ing, governments also use covenants to control land use. Governments choose between zoning
and covenants, and this choice illuminates the legal differences between the two tools. Covenants
and zoning are not distinguished by the substantive restrictions each tool can impose on land
use. Rather, a critical distinction between the two is that governments use the customizability of
covenants, as tools of private law, to limit citizen enforcement of the covenants' land use provi-
sions. Zoning, by contrast, allows for citizen enforcement. Zoning also requires greater public
participation and involves different amendment procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, two primary systems of land use control operate in
parallel: zoning and restrictive covenants.1 Zoning is the public sector's most
important land use tool; it is a regulatory mechanism rooted in the state police
power and entrusted to local governments by statute.2 For private parties, cov-
enants are the dominant method of controlling land use.3 Covenants are crea-
tures of the common law and available for use by all property owners. 4 While
zoning is conventionally associated with public regulation and covenants with
private regulation, this distinction is too neat. Local governments routinely use
both tools, mixing and matching the two forms of land use control to suit their
needs. Given that governments can impose both covenants and zoning, the dif-
ference between the tools does not merely stem from the party using them.
Rather, deep-seated legal differences between zoning and covenants remain
significant. In particular, while state law generally allows citizens to enforce
zoning codes in court,5 local governments can customize covenants to limit-or
eliminate- citizen enforcement. Many covenants between local governments
and private parties include explicit provisions allowing only the local govern-
ment, and not neighbors, to enforce the covenants' land use controls. 6 Cove-
nants, in other words, are not simply tools of private parties. Covenants are
tools of private law, and local governments harness their private law features,
particularly their customizability, to better control land use regulation.
1. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES lO62-64
(2007). There are many other forms of land use regulation, from environmental regulation
to nuisance law, but zoning and covenants are both extremely widespread and extremely
flexible tools. Id. at 1o61-62.
2. See 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 5 1:2 (4 th
ed. 2013).
3. See 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAw § 17.1
(rev. ed. 2014) (identifying "three types of legal tools" traditionally used to regulate land
use: nuisance suits, restrictive covenants, and zoning); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 713
(1973) (describing covenants as "perhaps the most prevalent type of private agreement be-
tween neighbors"). Following these, and many other, scholars, this Note ignores the legal
differences among covenants and in particular between real covenants and equitable servi-
tudes. See Jay Weiser, The Real Estate Covenant as Commons: Incomplete Contract Remedies
over Time, 13 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 269, 269 (2004) ("[Tjhese contractual interests may be
characterized as real covenants, equitable servitudes, or occasionally even easements, but for
purposes of this article, I will follow common parlance and refer to all promises relating to
land use as 'covenants.'").
4. See I ZEIGLER, supra note 2, § 1:1.
s. See infra text accompanying notes 78-84.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 85-98, 103-106.
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Because zoning and covenants are the dominant forms of land use control,7
legal scholars have long sought to understand the differences between them.'
In the early twentieth century, legal scholars emphasized that covenants pro-
vided a greater level of substantive control over development.9 Given the weak-
er regulatory state of the time, covenants could impose more precise and intru-
sive restrictions than zoning ordinances could.'" In recent years, though, those
substantive differences have fallen away as zoning has developed into an ex-
tremely flexible tool of land use regulation. Both zoning and covenants are now
commonly used to control every detail of what landowners may build on their
property, from the size, shape, and use of a building to far more arcane re-
strictions.'
Accordingly, legal scholars have turned their attention to the institutional
difference between covenants and zoning: they point out that private parties
use covenants to regulate land use while governments rely on zoning, and that
the differences between public and private regulators have significant practical
effects.' 2 Without diminishing the importance of that institutional difference,
this Note reasserts the importance of legal differences between covenants and
zoning. While private parties may not enact zoning ordinances, governments
can and frequently do use covenants to regulate land use under certain circum-
stances. In these situations, the Note points out, governments choose which
form of land use regulation to employ. Notably, local governments often
choose to use covenants for the largest, highest-stakes developments in their
jurisdictions. 3 By examining the government's choice between zoning and cov-
enants, this Note holds the institutional variable constant, opening a window
into the formal legal differences that still remain between zoning and cove-
nants.
In particular, the Note shows that local governments use covenants to limit
the parties who can enforce land use controls, usually to the covenants' signa-
tories. In contrast, courts broadly allow citizen enforcement of zoning ordi-
7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 15-20, 40-42.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
1o. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
ii. See discussion infra Part II.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 15-20. This distinction is complicated by the prevalence of
homeowner associations, which can be understood as akin to private governments. See gen-
erally EVAN McKENZIE, PRIvATOPIA: HoMEowNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDEN-
TIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994). But since their origins remain in the private sector,
homeowner associations fall outside the scope of this Note.
13. See, for example, the New Haven Coliseum project, infra notes 25-28, or the Riverside South
development, infra Part III.B.
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nances. Furthermore, there are likely several other important legal differences
between zoning and covenants as used by local governments. For example,
covenants allow governments to avoid the public participation built into the
zoning process. Covenants and zoning also differ in their degree of perma-
nence. Zoning can potentially last forever but is subject to unilateral amend-
ment by the government -another legal factor that may drive a government's
choice of land use control.
Where covenants are used to eliminate citizen enforcement, as municipali-
ties commonly do, covenants empower government officials and disempower
neighbors- a group that often has the most at stake for any development pro-
posal but just as often dominates local land use politics with its obstructionist,
Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) mentality. To counteract this tendency, I pro-
pose using the customizability of covenants not to eliminate but to recalibrate
citizen enforcement of land use regulations. Municipalities should allow citi-
zens to enforce particular provisions of covenants -or even allow only particu-
lar citizens to do so -and retain the sole power to enforce the remainder. This
proposal would strike a balance between the anti-development system of com-
plete citizen enforcement in zoning law'4 and the anti-accountability status quo
of no citizen enforcement in covenants.
Part I of this Note establishes that governments use covenants for land use
planning purposes, thereby challenging the scholarly consensus that covenants
and zoning are primarily distinguished on institutional grounds. Part II
demonstrates that municipalities do not choose to use covenants in order to
impose different substantive restrictions on the use of property, since zoning
can achieve functionally identical outcomes. Having shown that zoning and
covenants can be identical in both content and institutional origin, this Note
then turns to its central argument. Based on a review of covenants and case law
concerning municipally imposed covenants, Part III identifies an important
reason why local governments use covenants rather than zoning: to limit citi-
zen enforcement. Part III also argues that while cities are right to limit land use
litigation through the use of covenants, current practice goes too far, and rec-
ommends an alternative approach. Finally, Part IV notes additional legal rea-
sons why a municipality might choose covenants over zoning. Specifically, Part
IV explains that using covenants can enable governments to circumvent public
participation requirements built into zoning law. Additionally, covenants and
zoning are governed by different amendment and expiration procedures,
14. David Schleicher has identified certain procedural features of zoning law as contributing to
increasingly restrictive land use regulations. See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE
L.J. 1670, 1704-17 (2013). This Note shares Schleicher's emphasis on the importance of pro-
cedural and structural elements of zoning law.
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thereby providing governments and developers with different types of certainty
and permanence in the long term.
I. BEYOND INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS'
USE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
For most legal scholars, the primary difference between zoning and restric-
tive covenants is institutional: governments use zoning, while private parties
use covenants. Scholars tend to "posit zoning and restrictive covenants as al-
ternative and more or less interchangeable means of producing generally simi-
lar results."'" Put differently, zoning and covenants are thought to differ in
origin, not in legal effect. The legal consequences of regulation by a covenant
or by zoning are seen as largely the same. As one scholar wrote, "There is really
little difference between restrictive covenants imposed by a developer and zon-
ing regulations relating to setback lines, lot size, house size and the like, except
that one is a property right while the other is a municipal regulation.',
6
Even those scholars who focus on differences between covenants and zon-
ing emphasize institutional origins as the most important distinction between
the two systems. Robert Ellickson, for example, argues that the private-sector
nature of covenants imposes market discipline on their content and allows cov-
enants to optimize resource allocation among landowners. 7 For Ellickson, it is
the fact that private parties impose covenants, not the legal differences in how
covenants and zoning operate, that makes covenants economically preferable to
zoning. In the same law-and-economics tradition, William Fischel has argued
that although "[s]ome observers regard zoning and private covenants as essen-
tially the same thing," they are distinct because those establishing covenants
own the land being regulated and therefore must bear the opportunity cost of
not using the land for activities barred by the regulation.' 8 Similarly, Richard
Briffault distinguishes the two systems of land use control based on how much
consensus is required to impose restrictions on landowners: zoning requires
only a majority of politically engaged residents, while imposing covenants re-
15. Valerie Jaffee, Note, Private Law or Social Norms? The Use of Restrictive Covenants in Beaver
Hills, 116 YALE L.J. 1302, 13o6-07 (2007).
16. Robert R. Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use Planning: The New and the Old Reality,
1977 DuKE L.J. 841, 847 n.27.
17. Ellickson, supra note 3, at 713-14.
18. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAws: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO
AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 28 (1985).
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quires the unanimous consent of the affected property owners.' 9 Like Ellickson,
Briffault emphasizes the different origins of covenants and zoning regula-
tions- in the consensual private sphere and the majoritarian public sphere, re-
spectively- rather than the ways in which covenants and zoning might func-
tion differently from a legal perspective. Drawing from work by Richard
Brooks, Valerie Jaffee has argued that the use of covenants allows private par-
ties to send signals about the character of a neighborhood.' Even where zon-
ing renders covenants legally superfluous, Jaffee showed, because they are pri-
vately drafted, covenants allow homeowners to express what kind of
community they are; zoning, in contrast, can only send signals about the gov-
ernment's values. Each of these analyses shows a sophisticated understanding
of how zoning and covenants differ, but each identifies institutional origin as
the source of that difference.
The scholarly emphasis on the institutional origins of zoning and cove-
nants is generally appropriate: zoning is publicly generated and most cove-
nants are privately generated. Of course, only governments can zone, and nine-
ty-one percent of local governments in the United States's fifty largest
metropolitan areas have done so.' Private land use regulation through cove-
nants is similarly widespread. Homeowner associations established by cove-
nants govern more than half of all new housing in the fifty largest metropolitan
areas,' and covenants presumably govern some additional share without the
added layer of homeowner association governance.
However, covenants are not merely a private replacement for zoning. Out-
side the narrow context of conservation easements,2' legal scholars have largely
19. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346,
367 (1990).
2o. Jaffee, supra note is, at 1328-29, 1333-34. See generally RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M.
ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2013) (arguing that racially restrictive covenants served to signal the racial prefer-
ences of a neighborhood in addition to legally excluding non-whites).
21. RolfPendall et al., From Traditional to Reformed: A Review of the Land Use Regulations in the
Nation's so Largest Metropolitan Areas, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION METROPOLITAN POL'Y PRO-
GRAM 1O (Aug. 20o6), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2oo6/8
/metropolitanpolicy%2opendall/2oo6o8o2_pendall.pdf [http://perma.cc!6CCW-3UJG].
z2. Eran Ben-Joseph, Land Use and Design Innovations in Private Communities, LAND LINES, Oct.
2004, at 8, 8, https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dV967Land%2oLines%2010.o4%2ofinal
.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z3HZ-XFCF].
23. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON &VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 820
(3 d ed. 2005) (describing the government's acquisition of conservation easements to pre-
serve farmland and similar low-intensity land uses); Jessica Owley, Use of Conservation
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overlooked the fact that the same local governments regulating land use
through the zoning code also do so through covenants. 4 Take, for example,
the largest-ever downtown redevelopment project in New Haven, Connecticut:
the $395 million redevelopment of the New Haven Coliseum site.25 To facilitate
that project and others nearby, the City designed and enacted a brand new
zone, the BD- 3 business district, tailored to the development's needs.26 At the
same time, though, the City also signed a land disposition agreement-an
agreement to convey the land to a private developer, subject to various re-
strictions and covenants - governing the development of the same parcel.27 The
City thereby subjected the property to two independent sets of restrictions,
each of which the owner is obligated to follow. Rather than rely solely on
zoning or solely on its land disposition agreement, even though both were cus-
tom-designed for the project, the City chose to layer the two systems on top of
each other. Clearly, the City of New Haven believed that some municipal goals
for this high-profile project would be best served through zoning and others
through covenant.
Of course, a local government may not impose a covenant on a private
property owner unilaterally. To impose a covenant, it must have some power
over the property that allows the consensual negotiation of a covenant with the
property owner. For example, governments have this power when selling,
transferring or otherwise conveying publicly owned land to private developers,
as with the New Haven Coliseum, or when negotiating with landowners over
24. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Three Systems of Land-Use Control, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
67, 71 (1990) ("The imposition of new covenants is impractical in established urban neigh-
borhoods where landholdings are fragmented."); Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communi-
ties, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 833 ("[M]y analysis centers on a particular subset of difficul-
ties- those arising from land use controls in private developments made up of single-family
residences."). A notable exception is Susan French, the Reporter for the Restatement of Ser-
vitudes (Third), who has briefly noted that "public regulation itself often uses private servi-
tudes as tools of regulation." Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving
the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (1982).
25. See Thomas MacMillan, Coliseum Plan Coasts On, NEw HAVEN INDEP., Nov. 14, 2013,
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/coliseum-plan-Coasts-on
[http ://perma.cc/CWP3-9QDF].
26. Rachel Chinapen, New Haven Seeks Zone Change on Coliseum Site, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct.
7, 2013, http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/2ol3loo7/new-haven-seeks-zone-change
-on-coliseum-site [http://perma.cc/7JAZ-7MLZ].
27. Agreement Signed Today for Redevelopment of New Haven Coliseum Site, OFF. MAYOR
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.aspID=%7B5BF 9E78F
-B89A-4oA5-88oF-o661FFB 4 59E1% 7 D [http://perma.cc/JVB7-GSCC].
28. See, e.g., Whiting v. Seavey, 188 A.2d 276, 280 (Me. 1963) ("The law is well established that
restrictive covenants in a deed as to use of property are distinct and separate from the provi-
sions of a zoning law and have no influence or part in the administration of a zoning law.").
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discretionary land use approvals.29 The limited circumstances in which gov-
ernments can legally impose covenants shape the practical conditions in which
governments do so. First, covenants are more useful for regulating individual
projects than for broad, neighborhood-scale planning. It is unlikely that an en-
tire neighborhood would be publicly owned, or that all owners in the neigh-
borhood would be seeking a land use approval and be willing to subject them-
selves to covenants in exchange for those approvals. Second, governments are
likely to use covenants to regulate projects they support, on sites where they
want to promote development. Disfavored projects are unlikely to receive pub-
lic largesse in the form of discretionary land use approvals or title to public
land. A city will rarely use covenants to stifle development generally or to block
a particular development-it can simply deny the approvals or land transfers
that are preconditions to imposing a covenant in the first place. Covenants,
therefore, will generally be used when a local government wants to support
particular developments while still regulating them, not where it wants to
block or slow development or engage in broad-scale planning efforts.3"
Though governments cannot always impose restrictive covenants on pri-
vate developments, such covenants are still a regular part of the land use pro-
cess. Conveyances of public land are less common today than in recent decades,
when first urban renewal and then mass tax foreclosures in urban areas gener-
ated large portfolios of government-owned land." Still, eminent domain is of-
29. There may be other mechanisms by which governments subject land to covenants, but in
my research these appear to be the two significant categories.
30. A caveat to this general rule is that local governments frequently use conservation easements
to restrict development and preserve open space. Conservation easements are property in-
terests- though created by statute rather than common law and different from covenants in
important respects -meant to encourage the use of land for conservation in perpetuity.
Sometimes, local governments own land burdened by conservation easements, in which
case a local land trust may be given the power to enforce the restrictions. This, however, is
not a case in which the government is regulating private landowners, as with zoning or the
covenants that this Note discusses, but one in which the government is deciding how to
manage its own holdings. It does, however, underscore that the ability to designate who can
enforce a land use restriction is very important in the land use process, as this Note will dis-
cuss in the context of zoning and covenants. Local governments also hold conservation
easements that burden privately held land, in which case the government has been designat-
ed as the enforcer of the restrictions, in a manner more analogous to many of this Note's ex-
amples. Legally, however, conservation easements are created through a different process:
they are often donated to the local government, for example. See Owley, supra note 23.
31. See David W. Chen, One Housing Woe Gives Way to Another; New York Is No Longer Awash in
Abandoned Buildings. Now the Issue Is Supply., N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 21, 2003, http://
www. nytimes.com/2oo3/12/21/nyregion/one-housing-woe-gives-way-another-new-york-no
-longer-awash-abandoned-buildings.html [http://perma.cc/3BYS-SBSN] (describing the
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ten required for large and complex developments where many parcels of land
must be assembled. By using eminent domain, a government takes ownership
of development sites, at least temporarily. Covenants can therefore be used to
govern some of a city's most high-profile developments.? Moreover, govern-
ments regularly require the imposition of a covenant when granting a discre-
tionary land use approval." In New York City, for example, 146 zoning map
amendments -major land use decisions-have covenants associated with
them. 4 For smaller-scale land use matters, the New York City Department of
Buildings has created nine different standardized forms for landowners to use
in imposing restrictive covenants on themselves as part of the land use pro-
cess. 31 "[C] ompliance with certain provisions of zoning may require the execu-
tion of restrictive declarations," the Department explains. 6 In both large and
small land use matters, therefore, the City effectively conditions its grant of
certain land use permissions on the imposition of a City-drafted or City-
approved covenant rather than a special permit or other zoning-based mecha-
nism. Nor is this process unique to New York City. An overview of the law of
deed restrictions in Texas, for example, notes that sometimes covenants "are
placed on real property as part of the governmental land use approval process
or as a condition to zoning approval." 7
As this discussion shows, the institutional distinction between zoning and
covenants is asymmetrical. While private developers or groups of neighbors
must always use property law to control land use, local governments have the
32. See, e.g., Lorraine Mirabella, BDC Pushes To Finalize West-Side Contract, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 19, 2006, http://articles.baltimoresun.con/2oo6-2-19/business/o6l219oo 52-l
_lexington-square-dixon-mayor-omalley [http://perma.cc/QQ,4X-HC34] (describing ef-
forts to use eminent domain to facilitate a large-scale redevelopment of Baltimore's down-
town and to regulate land use on the redeveloped site through a land disposition agree-
ment).
33. See Land Use Law Ctr., Beginner's Guide to Land Use Law, PACE L. SCH. 44 (2015), http://
www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/LULC/LandUsePrimer.pdf [http://perma.cc/DQD4
-XZW 5] (stating that deed restrictions are "often used to insure that the owner complies
with a condition imposed by a land use body.").
34. City Planning Comm'n, Zoning Resolution Appendix D: Zoning Map Amendment ("D")
Restrictive Declarations, CITY N.Y. (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/htmVdcp/pdf/zone
/appendixd.pdf [http://perma.cc/RRE9-sSE9].
3S. Buildings Bulletin 2008-007, N.Y.C. BUILDINGS DEP'T 2 (Aug. 21, 2oo8), http://www.nyc.gov
/html/dob/downloads/pdf/bb_20o8-oo7.pdf [http://perma.cc/PZQZ-67U2].
36. Id.
37. Reid C. Wilson, Private Land Use Regulations: Deed Restrictions, WILSON, CRiBBS, GOREN &
FLAUm, P.C. 2 (June 29, 2001), http://www.wcglaw.net/docs/lo92o8527o-PRIVATE
-LAND-USE-REGULATIONS-200.PDF [http://perma.cc/PPZ2-TUP4].
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power to choose between property law and regulatory mechanisms." In these
situations, moreover, governments are not indifferent between their options:
they choose one over the other or mix and match. This suggests that zoning
and covenants are not merely public and private equivalents. Their formal dif-
ferences must manifest functionally as well, allowing for different substantive
outcomes even when used by the same party. By looking at covenants imposed
by governments, this Note reasserts the importance of the legal, rather than in-
stitutional, differences between public and private land use regulation.
II. BEYOND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES: ZONING AND COVENANTS
ALLOW EQUIVALENT CONTROL OVER LAND USE
In the early twentieth century, as the use of both zoning and restrictive cov-
enants spread quickly across the United States,39 legal scholars began to ex-
plore the advantages of these two forms of land use regulation. At that time,
the difference was understood to be clearly legal, not institutional. Covenants
offered a much wider range of substantive land use restrictions than zoning
did. "In planning the modern city, the public authorities can merely sketch the
broad outlines in their zoning ordinances," wrote a 1937 note in the Harvard
Law Review.4' Covenants were required because "zoning legislation can not...
provide for such things as regulating the cost of building, supervising the ar-
chitecture, or defining the requirements for occupancy. "' 4' A decade earlier, in
1928, M. T. Van Hecke explained that covenants, unlike zoning, could be used
to regulate everything from the shape of subdivided lots to the races of resi-
dents allowed to live on a property.
4
2
38. Another interesting arrangement is found in Houston, where there is no comprehensive
zoning, but a special statute allows the city government to enforce private covenants. See
generally Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1970). These cove-
nants were not drafted or negotiated by the city-many predate the statute's existence-and
so they fall outside the scope of this Note. These covenants reflect private, not public, pref-
erences for land use regulation. That said, Houston provocatively illustrates different ways
in which local governments use covenants to regulate land use, and particularly the im-
portance of enforcement in land use regulation.
39. See MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EucuD V. AMBLER 28-30 (2008).
40. Note, A New Phase in the Development of Affirmative Equitable Servitudes, S1 HARv. L. REv.
320, 321 (1937).
41. Id.
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Today, however, the choice to use covenants rather than zoning cannot be
explained by differences in their range of possible restrictions.43 As this Part
will demonstrate, changes in land use law have dramatically expanded the
reach of zoning. Essentially anything that covenants can restrict, zoning can re-
strict as well. Moreover, discretionary zoning techniques have turned zoning
from a set of generally applicable rules developed ex ante into development-
specific requirements negotiated by developers and governments on a case-by-
case basis. Therefore, zoning negotiations can now assume the same bargain-
ing posture as covenant negotiations. Accordingly, zoning not only can, but of-
ten will, contain the same restrictions as covenants to the extent that negotiated
zoning techniques are used. Local governments' choice of one or the other
must therefore reflect some difference other than the substantive land use re-
strictions imposed.
Since the 1930s, the substantive restrictions that covenants and zoning or-
dinances can legally require have converged. Most importantly, the Supreme
Court declared the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants unconstitu-
tional in Shelley v. Kraemer.' Governments had long been barred from enacting
racial zoning ordinances;4 Shelley put covenants and zoning on equal footing
in this regard. Outside the context of racial discrimination, zoning has become
dramatically more flexible and is now capable of imposing each of the re-
strictions that early twentieth century scholars believed could only be imposed
by covenant. Architectural restrictions are common features of zoning codes,
from bans on buildings that look too different from their neighbors to bans on
cookie-cutter developments with "excessive similarity.", 6 The Georgia Su-
preme Court has even upheld an ordinance specifying which styles of wood
fence could and could not be built in a particular zone.47 Zoning ordinances can
effectively require expensive homes by mandating minimum floor areas and
other high-cost design elements. 8 Subdivision regulations, governing lot size
43. This Part generalizes about the state of American land use law. Land use law of course varies
across all fifty states, and not every claim in this Part will necessarily be true in each state.
See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 1. 16 (5th ed. 2003).
44. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
45. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (1917).
46. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 2, § 16:17. Some jurisdictions even prohibit both buildings that are too
similar to their neighbors and too dissimilar from their neighbors. See Kenneth Regan,
Note, You Can't Build That Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and Architectural
Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1013, 1019 (1990).
47. City of Smyrnav. Parks, 242 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 1978).
48. See, e.g., RIVERSIDE, CAL., MUNICPAL CODE art. 5, ch. 19.1oo, S 19.100.070 (2o14) (requiring
new developments to have at least two of the following three amenities: playgrounds, pools
and barbeque equipment); FLORIDA CITY, FLA., ZONING CODES § 62-143 (2014) (requiring
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and shape, are widespread,49 and occupancy requirements, from single-family
requirements to Berkeley, California's "use quota" system requiring diverse
mixes of retail use, can be found throughout the country."0
Indeed, there may not be any meaningful limit on how prescriptive a zon-
ing code can be. As Hannah Wiseman has described, zoning rules can now be
"equally as detailed as the private covenants seen in suburban subdivisions.""1
In the extreme case, Jerold Kayden has argued that there are effectively no legal
limits on how prescriptive a zoning ordinance can be: hypothetically, zoning
could provide "a precise delineation of virtually every aspect of development
. . . specifying individually for each parcel precisely what public planners
want." 2 Regardless of whether such a comprehensive use of zoning is actually
legally permissible (politically, it is surely infeasible), zoning as a method of
land use regulation has gained near-total flexibility. Accordingly, it is extremely
unlikely that cities today choose to use covenants rather than zoning in order to
include substantively different land use controls.
The substantive convergence of zoning and covenants is made all the more
striking by the widespread use of zoning techniques that create negotiated, ra-
ther than mandated, regulatory requirements. Planned unit development ordi-
nances, for example, allow developers to approach local governments with a
proposed site plan for a parcel; if approved, the site plan replaces the underly-
ing zoning as the governing regulation. 3 This kind of discretionary, negotiated
review of land use proposals is increasingly common. In Kansas City, for ex-
ample, twenty-five square miles of the city were zoned as a "General Planned
Development District," in which all development must go through discretion-
ary review. 4 More commonly, municipalities simply impose extremely restric-
both minimum lot area and minimum floor area. But see Eleanor Charles, In the
Region: Connecticut and Westchester; Is Minimum-Floor-Area Zoning Legal?, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 27, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/o3/27/realestate/in-the-region-connecticut
-and-westchester-is-minimum-floor-area-zoning-legal.html [http ://perma.cc/P2GE-JJUQJ
(noting that New Jersey and Massachusetts had eliminated minimum floor area require-
ments statewide).
49. See, e.g., Stratford Planning Comm'n, Subdivision Regulations: Regulations Providing for Land
Subdivision in the Town of Straford, Conn., TowN OF STRATFORD ch. 5, § 7, at 13 (May 26,
2oo9), http://townofstratford.com/filestorage/'3o2/4o2/619/SubdivRegs.pdf [http://perma
.cc/W 4XW-49VU.
5o. See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of sin-
gle-family zoning); I ZIEGLER, supra note 2, § 11:9 (describing the Berkeley ordinance).
51. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEo. L.J. 697, 719 (2010).
52. Jerold S. Kayden, Reconsidering Zoning: Expanding an American Land-Use Frontier, 1 ZONING
PRAC. 2, 5 (2004).
53. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 2, § 88:1.
54. Id. 5 11:ui.
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tive zoning rules governing what may be built as-of-right, without discretion-
ary action by the government, and wait for developers to seek variances, rezon-
ings or other forms of discretionary relief s"
These negotiated land use regulations eliminate another important set of
differences between zoning and covenants. First, traditional zoning imposed
generally applicable rules enacted independently of any particular development
proposal, while covenants were negotiated project-by-project s6 Discretionary
zoning techniques allow local governments to custom-tailor their regulations
to a specific development proposed at a specific moment, just as governments
can with covenants. Second, such discretionary processes put the full range of
land use issues on the negotiating table. A local government might request
that, in exchange for land use approvals formally related only to, say, building
height, a developer provide additional parking, affordable units, mansard
roofs, or land for a new elementary school.' This sort of dealing over land use
permissions remains common, the Supreme Court's exactions jurisprudence
notwithstanding. 8 Given the amount of discretion being exercised, the few
5s. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise Development
System, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 28, 48 (1981).
56. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 11 (1966) (stating that "preregulation gives
way to negotiation" as traditional zoning techniques are replaced with newer, flexible zoning
mechanisms); see also STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PEl&ALVER, LAND USE REGULATION
31 (2011) ("[T]raditional Euclidean zoning has 'the virtue of certainty and the handicap of
rigidity."' (quoting Lutz v. City of Longview, 520 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wash. 1974))).
57. Cf. William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50
LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 101, 103 (1987) (noting that in exchange for permission to build at
greater-than-allowed densities, a developer might "make payments in kind: improvements
in a local park, contributions to a housing fund, or construction of a museum"); see also Vic-
ki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another Variation on
the Exactions Theme, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 5, 17 (2010) (discussing the use of community bene-
fits agreements, sometimes formally or informally incorporated into the public land use pro-
cess, to regulate issues, like wages, that normally fall outside of the scope of zoning).
58. The Supreme Court has attempted to impose Takings Clause restrictions on what govern-
ments may exact from developers in exchange for discretionary land use approvals. The
Court has required both a nexus between the exaction sought and the purpose of the land
use regulation, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), and "rough pro-
portionality" between the extent of the exaction and the impact of the development, Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Despite the Court's intervention, however,
dealmaking over these exactions- including dealmaking that likely violates the require-
ments of Nollan and Dolan-remains commonplace in the land use process. See David A.
Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1286-1302
(1997) (describing the likelihood that developers and local governments will circumvent
limits on exactions, given the prevalence of repeat players in local land use and the desire to
protect mutually advantageous deals); Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process by Another
Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 30 TOURo L. REv. 403, 418
(2014) ("Nollan and Dolan's federal constitutionalization of exactions only presaged the
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factors that are legally not subject to traditional zoning, like the identity of the
developer, can quietly enter into the equation as well, and all of these factors
can be weighed against each other during negotiations. s9 Whether the result of
the negotiations is a planned unit development or a covenant, it is a custom-
negotiated set of plans and rules that governs development. To the extent that
local governments force developers to go through a broad discretionary review
process, governments can negotiate for the same deals as those they would seek
in covenant negotiations.6 ° Municipalities therefore seem not to be choosing
covenants over zoning - or at least not over discretionary zoning tools - in or-
der to impose substantively different land use controls.
Two New York City programs provide a striking illustration of how cove-
nants and zoning have converged in terms of the substantive regulations they
can impose. First is the city's (E) designation program, designed to ensure
landowner compliance with promises about environmental remediation made
during rezonings.6' When originally created, the (E) designation, which is part
of the zoning code, was used only for properties not controlled by the rezoning
applicant, such as properties affected by city-initiated rezonings.62 Where the
rezoning applicant controlled the property, the City instead used a restrictive
practice's wide expansion . . . and the expanded use of exactions no doubt also led to a
greater absolute number of abusive conditions that landowners did not challenge."); Roder-
ick Hills, Koontz's Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial Equivocation Save the Court from
a Doctrinal Quagmire?, PRAwFsBLAwG (June 25, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs
.com/prawfsblawg/2o13/o6/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedial-equivocation
-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.htm [http://perma.cc/B79Q-L7X5] (describing
Nollan and Dolan as a "dead letter" due to a remedy that is worse for developers than the un-
constitutional exaction). The Supreme Court's recent Koontz decision, Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct 2586 (2013), may unsettle this status quo, but its effects
remain to be seen.
sq. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALU
L.J. 385, 405-06, 408 (1977) (discussing developer influence over zoning through contribu-
tions and "graft"); Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bar-
gaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 337, 367-68 (2002) (describ-
ing how negotiations over zoning, particularly "underground" negotiations, can lead to
"favoritism or corruption"); Leslie Berkman, Favoritism To Select Firms Alleged: Irvine Adopts
Zoning for New Corporate Land Use, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com
/1986-o1-15/news/mn-28128_1 corporate-development [http ://perma.cc/9LQ2-EDJL].
60. Indeed, the Supreme Court's land use exactions jurisprudence subjects negotiated dedica-
tions of property interests to Takings Clause analyses similar to that applied to zoning re-
strictions. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586.
61. E-Designation Program, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oer
/html/e-designation/e-designation.shtml [http://perma.cc/B3FM-DBPU].
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declaration, a form of covenant.63 In 2012, however, New York City merged the
two programs on the grounds that they were entirely redundant. 64 The City
had come to realize that using zoning for some properties and covenants for
others did not produce different outcomes for the city. "Having these two dif-
ferent mechanisms within the (E) Program that achieve the same result is un-
necessary," explained the New York City Department of City Planning.6s The
original distinction stemmed from a City administrative rule in place at the
time, not from any underlying legal difference between zoning and covenant-
based methods.6 6 The merger was meant to make environmental remediation
requirements easier for the city to monitor by bringing all (E) designations into
the same legal framework.6, Substantively, the zoning and covenant-based
mechanisms were "exact equivalent[s] .,68 Notably, environmental remediation
falls relatively far outside the normal bulk and use concerns of land use regula-
tion, yet both zoning and covenants were equally capable of regulating it.
A second case study not only demonstrates the substantive equivalence be-
tween regulatory and property law-based systems of land use controls, but also
points toward an important reason that municipalities choose covenants over
zoning. Since 1961, the New York City Zoning Code has encouraged develop-
ers to build publicly accessible plazas and lobbies as part of their projects. 69 In
exchange for public space at ground level, the City allows developers to build
taller structures.7' For fourteen years, this program was administered entirely
through public law mechanisms.7' In 1975, the City added a new property law
mechanism for administering the plaza program: "IT] he owner would now file
an additional legal instrument, a restrictive declaration running with the parcel,
restating the obligations already outlined in the Zoning Resolution.... "'
This reform was not intended to allow greater flexibility in the type of pub-
lic space that developers could provide or other substantive differences in the








69. See JEROLD S. KAYDEN, THE N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING & THE MUN. ART SOC'Y OF
N.Y., PRIVATELY OWNED PUB1IC SPACE: THE NEWYORK CITYExPERIENCE 1 (2000).
70. Id.
7. Id. at 17, 40-41.
72. Id. at 17.
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"redundancy" and, more specifically, a supplemental enforcement mechanism
for the City. 3 Enforcement is essential to the plaza program's success: once a
taller tower is complete, private owners often unlawfully restrict public access
to plaza spaces, gating them off or renting them to restaurants.74 When zoning
rules alone govern these plazas, the restrictions must be enforced through the
standard tools of zoning, namely administrative or civil actions, or criminal
sanctions.7' Moreover, courts allow citizens to enforce zoning provisions if they
"can establish that they have suffered special damage." 76 In contrast, the use of
covenants to govern plazas allows a measure of private law flexibility in deter-
mining who may challenge landowner behavior in court. In the plaza context,
the use of restrictive declarations allows for "different consequences on en-
forcement depending on how [the declaration] is drafted," particularly affect-
ing "who can bring the action to enforce."' Adding covenants on top of the
zoning code did not allow the City to change the substance of its plaza pro-
gram; rather, it allowed the City to augment its enforcement powers on a case-
by-case basis. As the next Part will show, these differences in enforcement are
perhaps the most important reason why municipalities turn to covenants de-
spite having the power to zone. Local governments choose to avoid zoning in
order to control who may enforce land use restrictions.
III. THE PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCE: GOVERNMENTS USE
COVENANTS TO LIMIT CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT OF LAND USE
CONTROLS
A. Citizen Enforcement of Zoning; Custom Enforcement of Covenants
Municipalities use covenants to control the enforceability of land use re-
strictions in contexts far beyond New York City's privately owned public spac-
es, as this Part will show. Litigated cases concerning municipally imposed cov-
enants, as well as the terms of the covenants themselves, reveal this sensitivity
to enforcement mechanisms. Those cases and covenants show that municipali-
73. Id. at 41.
74. See Jake Schabas, Putting the Public Back in Midtown's Privately Owned Public Spaces,
STREETSBLOG NYC (May 22, 2012), http://www.streetsblog.org/2o12/o5/22/putting-the
-public-back-in-midtowns-privately-owned-public-spaces [http://perma.cc/EB8B-OADP].
75. JEROLD S. KAYDEN, THE N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING & THE MUN. ART SOC'Y OF N.Y.,
supra note 69, at 40-41.
76. Id. at 41.
77. E-mail from Jerold S. Kayden, Frank Backus Williams Professor of Urban Planning & De-
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ties pay close attention to the issue of who may enforce their covenants and
guard that prerogative for themselves. Usually, local governments declare their
covenants enforceable only by the property owner and the municipality itself,
thereby retaining total control over the actual implementation of the land use
plan, as the municipality becomes the only party capable of enforcing land use
regulations against the developer. In contrast, zoning is broadly enforceable by
citizens, giving neighbors the power to compel compliance with land use re-
strictions. The starkly different enforcement regimes under zoning- and cove-
nant-based land use controls-and municipalities' explicit efforts to use cove-
nants to limit citizen enforcement- demonstrate that enforcement is often a
principal consideration when local governments choose to use one tool or the
other.
Generally, affected neighbors may challenge development as non-
compliant with zoning. Zoning enabling acts authorize citizen suits both to
seek review of administrative action and to directly enforce zoning rules against
neighbors. 8 Under the doctrine of aggrievement, an analogue of standing, citi-
zens must be specially damaged in some way to bring a challenge under the
zoning laws.79 However, the standards for aggrievement tend to be fairly gen-
erous to litigants. For example, Maryland considers nearby property owners to
be prima facie aggrieved by zoning violations and places the burden of proving
the plaintiff not aggrieved on the developer.s In most states, a person need not
be a resident of a particular municipality to challenge its land use decisions, so
long as she is adversely affected by them.s1 In some cases, citizens can even
challenge a zoning decision as taxpayers without showing special damage,"2 an
action rarely allowed in non-zoning contexts. s Courts' willingness to hear a
wide range of litigants in zoning disputes reflects a belief that land use is a fun-
damentally public and participatory concern. As argued by the California Su-
preme Court, "[C]ommon sense and wise public policy ... require an oppor-
78. See Ross D. Cohen, Note, Why Require Standing if No One Is Seated? The Need To Clarify
Third Party Standing Requirements in Zoning Challenge Litigation, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 623, 642-
48 (2004) (cataloguing citizen enforcement doctrine across many states).
79. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 2, § 63:3.
8o. Wier v. Witney Land Co., 263 A.2d 833, 838 (Md. 1970).
81. See Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 492 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Cal. 1972) ("States which have consid-
ered the issue have generally held that affected property owners or residents have standing
to contest a municipality's zoning even though they are not residents of the municipality.").
82. Dover Twp. Homeowners & Tenants Ass'n v. Dover Twp., 276 A.2d 156, 159 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1971).
83. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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tunity for property owners to be heard before ordinances which substantially
affect their property rights are adopted .... "4
In contrast to this broadly public enforcement system for zoning, the en-
forcement regime for municipally imposed covenants is often tightly limited.
Municipalities routinely write covenants that forbid citizen enforcement, and
the courts routinely enforce those limits. In one New York case, for example,
the owner of an affordable housing complex attempted to convert its property
to market-rate apartments.8 ' The residents sued, alleging that the conversion
violated a covenant between the owner and New York City requiring the build-
ing to remain affordable for forty years.8 6 Under New York law, the tenants
would have had standing to enforce the covenant if it were intended for their
benefit."s Although it might seem that a covenant requiring the property to
remain affordable would be intended for the benefit of the very tenants receiv-
ing affordable units, the court held that this covenant reflected no such intent.
A clause of the covenant "explicitly negate[d] any intent to permit its enforce-
ment by third parties such as plaintiffs."88 Honoring that clause, the court held
that the tenants were not beneficiaries of the covenant and therefore lacked
standing to sue.8' By the covenant's clear terms, only the City could enforce the
covenant's restrictions.
This scenario repeats itself in other cases. Residents of a planned communi-
ty in Washington, D.C., for example, were deemed merely "incidental benefi-
ciaries" of a series of covenanted promises by the developer, including a prom-
ise that the residents would be entitled to purchase stock in the development
company.9" The District and the developer had limited enforcement to the Dis-
trict's redevelopment authority and the federal government in not one but four
different sections of their covenant.9 "[N]o person other than a party to the
Agreement or a successor or assign, shall have any right to enforce the terms of
the Agreement against a party, its successors or assigns," stated the covenant. 92
Here again, the explicit terms of the covenant made promises -whose seem-
84. Scott, 492 P.2d at 1141 (quoting Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d lo, 17 (Cal. 1958)).
85. See Mendel v. Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 844 N.E.zd 748, 750-51 (N.Y. 2006).
86. Id. at 750.
87. Id. at 751.
88. Id.
89. Id.
go. Fort Lincoln Civic Ass'n. v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055, 1O67 (D.C.
2008).
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ingly sole purpose was to benefit a specific set of residents -unenforceable by
those same residents.
Another example from New York City shows the variation that is possible
in these covenant provisions limiting enforcement, as well as the high stakes of
the litigation surrounding them. In 2014, Greenwich Village residents went to
court to try to stop a massive, 1.9-million-square-foot expansion of New York
University. 93 The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the City had un-
lawfully lifted deed restrictions imposed on the properties being redeveloped
when they were first built as part of urban renewal.94 However, since those re-
strictions also included an explicit clause defining who could enforce the cove-
nant, the plaintiffs were denied standing to bring that claim.9" Interestingly,
that covenant allowed not only the parties, but also the federal housing com-
missioner, to enforce its terms. 96 In that case, in addition to blocking citizen
enforcement, the parties had drafted their covenant to create a novel joint local-
federal enforcement system, which matched the local-federal political structure
driving urban renewal.97 Covenants can be customized to provide whatever en-
forcement scheme the parties deem appropriate.
Nor are these examples unique to the context of large-scale urban devel-
opment. Rather, it is normal professional practice to include clauses limiting
citizen enforcement in government-imposed covenants. West Publishing,
which provides standardized forms of legal documents intended to serve as the
foundation for lawyers drafting their own agreements, includes such a limita-
tion in its standard form for a land disposition agreement between a city and a
developer. 98 Limiting citizen enforcement is, at least from West's perspective, a
best practice for governments drafting covenants.
The customizability of covenants' enforcement schemes can be used not
only to limit citizen enforcement but also to expand it. Writing in 1954, the
then chairman of the Cook County Board of Zoning Appeals described a prac-
tice of using covenants to grant residents (of the entire county or some part of
93. Glick v. Harvey, No. 1O3844/12, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 35, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7,
2014).
94. Id. at *54-55.
9s. Id. at *56-57.
96. Id. at *56.
97. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959, 970 (2007) (describing urban renewal as a "[h]allmark" of
an era of "[d]irect federal-local relations").
98. See 3 STUART M. SAFT, CoMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FoRMs pt. II, ch. lo, app. ioA, § ioA:13
( 3d ed. 2014).
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it) the power to enforce land use restrictions.99 The Board, in considering an
application for a zoning-based land use approval, would require that the appli-
cant impose a covenant on its property.00 Those covenants would "conven-
tionally recite that their terms inure to the benefit of and may be enforced by
inhabitants of the county-in some cases, property owners within a specified
radius -in which the premises are located." °1 Here, the zoning authority used
covenants to allow citizen enforcement beyond what a court might allow under
the aggrievement doctrine, as well as to choose whether all residents or only
property owners would be given that power. Although today, sixty years later,
the government is more likely to use covenants to limit citizen enforcement
than to expand it-perhaps due to the refinement of zoning practices over
those decades-Cook County's experience shows that covenants can be em-
ployed for either purpose."'
The use of covenants to control citizen enforcement is possible only be-
cause the courts do not try to import zoning's broad standing doctrine into
covenant-based systems of land use control. Courts maintain the formalist dis-
tinction between covenants and zoning-even though functionally, covenants
might contain identical substantive restrictions imposed by identical parties.
That distinction reflects courts' fundamentally different understandings of pri-
vate and public law. Just as the California Supreme Court saw the broad en-
forceability of zoning as rooted in the nature of zoning as a fundamentally pub-
lic concern,0 3 courts see the enforcement of municipal covenants as
fundamentally private, even when zoning and covenants deal with the same is-
sues of land use regulation. Maryland's Court of Appeals, for example, relied
on the private law/public law distinction in denying neighboring landowners
standing to challenge an agreement between the City of Baltimore and a pri-
vate party establishing land use controls for a Baltimore redevelopment pro-
99. Andrew J. Dallstream & Robert S. Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and Special Uses, 1954 U. ILL.
L.F. 213, 236-38.
loo. Id. at 236.
101. Id.
102. An interesting question is whether center cities - the municipalities that form the geographic
or economic heart of a metropolitan area- use covenants differently from suburbs or small
towns. The examples provided-New York; New Haven; Baltimore; Washington, D.C.;
and Cook County- all concern center cities. This may reflect the generally higher-stakes de-
velopment projects in cities, which are likelier to lead to reported cases, or the better media
coverage of urban real estate, each of which make such examples higher profile. It may,
however, also be the case that urban and suburban governments impose different cove-
nants - though the West form provides reason to believe otherwise. See SAFT, supra note 98.
103. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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ject.' °4 According to the court, the agreement was "not a... land use decision[]
with attendant principles extending standing to nearby aggrieved landowners.
Generally defined, a land use decision is a decision (typically an ordinance or
regulation) enacted or promulgated by a legislative or administrative body."
0 5
Here, the court formalistically differentiated public and private forms of land
use regulation, even though the regulations themselves might have been sub-
stantively the same. Without this formalism, local governments could not use
covenants to get around zoning's citizen enforcement mechanisms.
As express contractual clauses, these limitations on citizen enforcement re-
flect the clear intent of the parties writing them. New York City could have, ra-
ther than expressly denying the residents of affordable housing units benefi-
ciary status, expressly declared that they were the beneficiaries of the covenant-
based affordability requirement. The City elected to take the opposite ap-
proach. Where these clauses exist, municipalities affirmatively prefer control-
ling enforcement to permitting citizen enforcement or, more precisely, munici-
palities prefer negotiating for covenants that limit citizen enforcement to nego-
negotiating for covenants that allow it.1° 6 Given that municipalities can secure
roughly identical substantive land use restrictions through zoning or cove-
nants, this enforcement preference stands out as a distinctively legal, rather
than institutional, reason for why municipalities choose covenants over zoning.
B. A Case Study: Riverside South
Both the substantive overlap between covenants and zoning and the con-
scious use of covenants to tailor and limit enforcement are captured perfectly
by the saga of the Riverside South development along Manhattan's West Side.
The former site of the New York Central Railroad's rail yards, Riverside South
stretches from 59 th Street to 72nd Street along the Hudson River, making it
one of New York City's largest recent developments. 10 7 Plans to redevelop the
104. See 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 43 A- 3d 355, 356-60, 365 (Md. 2012).
los. Id. at 365.
w06. In some cases, it may be the developer that proposes the limit on citizen enforcement; the
completed documents do not capture the back-and-forth of negotiations. The municipality
must still agree to the clause, however, and can trade its acquiescence for more favorable
terms elsewhere in the agreement. So municipalities may consistently choose to trade away
citizen enforcement because they value it less than developers do. For the purposes of this
Note, which looks at why municipalities would use covenants to begin with, the result is
largely the same.
107. Jim Dwyer, Trump's Folly Shakes City, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Nov. 11, 1997, http://www
.nydailynews.com/archives/news/trump-folly-shakes-city-article-.769526 [http://perma.cc
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area date back to 1962, when the railroad teamed up with the Amalgamated
Lithographer's Union to propose 12,ooo residential units on the site, as well as
commercial uses."O8 That proposal failed, as did six subsequent plans.' 9 Com-
munity opposition killed many of the development efforts, particularly Donald
Trump's plans to build the world's tallest building on the site."' In the early
199os, though, there was finally a breakthrough. Trump partnered with
neighborhood, local and, national civic groups to develop a scaled-down site
plan that included neighborhood amenities like parkland."' Though many
neighbors remained livid about the prospect of waterfront development-
particularly those whose views would be impeded-the project was ushered
through the land use process with relative ease." 2
The deal struck to govern the development of Riverside South was ex-
tremely complex and required a lengthy series of city approvals."3 Even so, the
most important document regulating land use at Riverside South was not the
New York City zoning resolution but rather the restrictive covenant signed by
Trump." 4 That covenant regulates even those aspects of land use most tradi-
tionally regulated through zoning: floor area, the building envelope, and the
/6SNC-FU7H] ("Riverside South is said to be the largest private development in the history
of the city.").
los. Julia Vitullo-Martin, The West Side Rethinks Donald Trump's Riverside South, MANHATrAN




m1. David W. Dunlap, Plan Readied for a Smaller Trump City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 1992, http://www.nytimes.corV1992/o2/16/realestate/plan-readied-for-a-smaller-trump
-city.html [http://perma.cc/MY2J-74KJ].
112. See, e.g., Eliot Brown, Remember Trump City?, N.Y. OBSERVER, Aug. 5, 2oo8,
http://observer.conV2oo8/o8/remember-trump-city [http://perma.cc/S6HL-ETEV]; James
C. McKinley, Jr., Trump's Riverside West Plan Appears To Be Gaining Favor, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/17/nyregion/trump-s-riverside-west-plan
-appears-to-be-gaining-favor.html [http://perma.cc/WLD8-4RAU].
113. Report, Application C 920357 ZMM, CITY PLAN. COMMISSION (Oct. 26, 1992), http://www
.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/cpc/920357.pdf [http://perma.cc/F2L8-WHGA] (describing over
two dozen needed land use approvals, including amendments to the zoning map, special
permits required pursuant to the zoning regulations, and others).
114. See, e.g., Eliot Brown, Extell Steaming Ahead on Giant 'Riverside Center' Amid Early Dissent,
N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 31, 2008, http://observer.conV2oo8/lo/extell-steaming-ahead-on
-giant-riverside-center-amid-early-dissent [http://perma.cc/G5XG-AB5C] (discussing re-
cent efforts to change the land use restrictions on the Riverside South site, with an emphasis
on the restrictive declaration rather than on zoning).
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location of retail uses, for example."' The City could easily have controlled the-
se features of the development through the zoning code; it instead chose to do
so through a covenant.
The Riverside South covenant also includes detailed language specifying
who may enforce its terms, and how. First, the covenant states that no person
other than the landowner, the condo association for Riverside South residents,
or the City may enforce the terms of the covenant.16 By including the residents
of the project, this covenant allows slightly broader enforcement than some city
-imposed covenants -such as the previously mentioned covenant that barred
tenants from enforcing its affordability requirements - but still shuts neighbors
out of the enforcement process. Second, the covenant expressly allows the City
to punish violations of the covenant as if they were zoning violations, by revok-
ing building permits, certificates of occupancy, or special permits." 7 In other
words, it seems that the City recreated the land use enforcement regime of the
zoning code in a covenant and then explicitly modified that regime to eliminate
citizen enforcement. This covenant was carefully custom-drafted to cut the
West Side's famously assertive neighborhood activists out of the enforcement
process.
The City was right to worry that neighbors would attempt to block even
this carefully negotiated deal. A slew of lawsuits attempted to halt develop-
ment."8 That litigation underscores how important enforcement mechanisms
were in the creation of the Riverside South covenant: one of the plaintiffs' cen-
tral claims was that the covenant "was illegal because it denied petitioners'
members [sic] enforcement rights."" 9 The plaintiffs were thus well aware that
the covenant had cut them out of the enforcement process - they identified this
feature of the covenant and highlighted it in their lawsuit -and felt that it was
worth fighting in court. The project's opponents lost on that claim at trial, on
appeal, and at the state's high court, which deemed the claim "without merit"
without even elaborating. 2 Though plaintiffs attempted to bring the River-
115. Report, Application C 100296(A) ZSM, CrrY PLAN. COMMISSION exhibit B ("Parcel LMN Re-
strictive Declaration"), § 2.01(b), at 16-19 (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp
/pdf/cpc/00296a.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PLW-6-EAU].
116. Id. exhibitB, S 7.03, at 78.
117. Id. exhibit B, § 7.04, at 78-79.
118. See Coal. for a Liveable Westside, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 95 CIV.
7672 (JSM), 1997 WL 349950 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997); Coal. Against Lincoln W., Inc. v.
City of New York, 654 N.E.ad 86 (N.Y. 1995); Cmty. Bd. 7 of Manhattan v. Schaffer, 639
N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1994); Coal. Against Lincoln W., Inc. v. Weinshall, 799 N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005).
11g. City of New York, 654 N.E.2d at 88.
120. Id. at 88, 90.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
side South covenant under zoning's liberal regime of citizen enforcement,1 21 the
courts were utterly unsympathetic. Indeed, understanding the stakes clearly,
the appellate court stated that the intent of the covenant was to place enforce-
ment "in the hands of responsible authorities whose actions will undoubtedly
be taken for the benefit of the City and not for the benefit of a favored few.""
As this litigation shows, the covenant's drafters, its opponents, and the courts
all saw the covenant's enforcement provisions as factors differentiating the cov-
enant from traditional zoning and as municipal choices of central importance
in shaping the future of Riverside South.
C. Using the Flexibility of Covenants To Improve Land Use Planning
As the Riverside South story illustrates, the stakes can be high in the choice
between public and private law mechanisms of land use regulation. The City
and developer seem to have carefully crafted enforcement mechanisms that dis-
empowered neighborhood opponents in order to protect the project; those
same opponents went to court and tried to reinsert themselves in the enforce-
ment process in order to reshape or derail the development. These parties ap-
pear to have understood that in the land use context, as in administrative law
more generally, citizen suits are powerful tools, offering the promise of greater
compliance with important legal protections and the peril of over-enforcement
dictated by an unrepresentative few. This Part argues that in the land use con-
text specifically, some citizen enforcement is valuable but that local govern-
ments go too far when using covenants to eliminate citizen enforcement entire-
ly. The following discussion calls for greater balance, suggesting that
governments use covenants to limit but not foreclose citizen enforcement of
land use regulations.
Administrative law scholars have debated the merits of citizen suits at
length. On the one hand, citizen suits are seen as effective mechanisms for in-
creasing the enforcement of regulations by deputizing concerned individuals to
augment the capacity of often understaffed, and sometimes politically cap-
tured, agencies. 23 In addition to this primary function, citizen suits can also
improve public enforcement of the law by providing competition; preserve
public resources by placing the cost of enforcement on private parties; and
121. Brief for Petitioner, Coal. Against Lincoln W., Inc. v. City of New York, 654 N.E.2d 86
(N.Y. 1995) (No. 109439/93), 1995 WL 17051591, at *43-49.
122. Id. at *47 (quoting Petitioners' Appendix at 19, City of New York, 654 N.E.2d 86).
123. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH.
J. 55, S6 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 221-22 (1992).
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serve participatory goals by bringing citizens into the enforcement and judicial
processes. 4 On the other hand, critics worry that citizen suits strip agencies of
their control over the enforcement agenda and ability to exercise prosecutorial
discretion.' Unlike an agency, critics argue, single-issue advocates lack the po-
litical legitimacy to set enforcement priorities, the ability to balance competing
,,6concerns, and the incentive to cooperate with regulated parties. Citizen en-
forcers can also disrupt an agency's ability to negotiate with regulated parties
over compliance: even if the agency promises not to bring an enforcement ac-
tion, private parties can still do so. 27
Both the costs and benefits of citizen enforcement generally can be felt
sharply in the land use context. Citizen suits are likely to dramatically increase
enforcement of zoning rules. Local governments generally have limited re-
sources, which limits their ability to monitor violations and enforce zoning
rules directly.' In contrast, the immediate neighbors of a property are both
well-placed to monitor violations and invested in doing so.29 Accordingly,
those protective of property owners' ability to halt unwanted neighborhood
changes have celebrated the liberal aggrievement doctrine in zoning. 3 At the
same time, citizen enforcement of zoning is likely to validate the concerns of
critics. Citizen suits are most likely to come from anti-development homeown-
ers, who are famously litigious in attempting to halt unwanted changes to their
124. See, e.g., James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, to
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 3-6 (2003); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citi-
zen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 198-99.
125. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 662
(2000).
126. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Adminis-
trative Regulation, 1985 WIs. L. REV. 655, 673-78.
127. See Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental
Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys General, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 220, 223 (1987)
(" [C]itizen suits may make the attainment of the optimal mix of cooperation and deterrence
under the environmental laws very difficult.").
128. See Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 6o8 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y.
2009), affd, 594 F.3d 94 (2d Cit. 2010) ("The City's enforcement of its zoning regulations
has been inconsistent and less than vigorous."); Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Com-
merce: Zoning Law and the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191, 1228 n.179
(2001) ("Zoning enforcement is notoriously lax and frequently complaint driven.");
Kathryn Wall, Law Enforcement Sales Tax Will Now Pay for Some Positions in Greene County,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Nov. 23, 2013, http://archive.news-leader.coM/article/20131123
/NEWSo1/311230027/Greene-County-budget [http://perma.cc/PKL4-ZFLY] (reporting that
zoning enforcement was being eliminated in rural areas due to budget cuts).
1i9. See Ellickson, supra note 24, at 72.
130. See, e.g., Robert A. Hendel, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 294, 307 (1967).
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neighborhood. 3' For controversial projects, using zoning does not merely al-
low citizen enforcement of land use controls; it all but guarantees such en-
forcement. Moreover, litigants often proceed from a parochial rather than city-
wide perspective and are typically more concerned with stopping development
than regulating it.'32 In the land use context, therefore, citizen suits are both
important mechanisms for augmenting the capacity for public enforcement and
potential weapons of NIMBY obstructionism.
Substantively, either over-enforcement or under-enforcement of land use
regulations is undesirable. Over-enforcement of land use regulations, along
with other forms of local opposition to new development, drives up housing
costs, making cities and suburbs alike increasingly unaffordable for moderate-
income households, and exacerbates environmentally destructive urban
sprawl. 133 But while excessive restrictions on development are socially undesir-
able, some amount of land use planning is widely considered salutary.3 4 Such
131. See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Rob-
ert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood," 7 GEo. MASON L. REv. 881, 882-83 (1999) ("If
NIMBYs fail to reduce the scale and density of the project at these reviews, they often de-
ploy alternative regulatory rationales ... at other local, state and federal government fo-
rums, including courts of law."); Kmiec, supra note 55, at 79 ("To protect their interests, in-
dividual property owners use zoning and zoning litigation to stop development or slow
the development process."); see also Andrew J. Hawkins, Upper East Side Won't Hear
Defeat on Waste-Transfer Station, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS. (Apr. 21, 2013, 12:O1 AM),
http://www.crainsnewyork.conVarticle/2o13o421/REAL-ESTATE/3o421998o/upper-east
-side-wont-hear-defeat-on-waste-transfer-station [http://perma.cc/4DW8-FX3P] (stating
that Upper East Side residents have lost eleven consecutive lawsuits against an unwanted
waste transfer station and continue to fight).
13. Cf. Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N
288, 289-91 (1992) (discussing the typical profile of community opposition to unwanted de-
velopment).
133. See Robert L. Liberty, Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for Environ-
mentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AmF. L. REV. 581 (2003) (integrat-
ing the vast literatures on the economic and environmental impacts of restrictions on dense
development).
,3. See BABCOCK, supra note 56, at 17 ("[T]housands of local officials regard zoning as the great-
est municipal achievement since the perfection of public sanitary systems."); I ZiEGLE , su-
pra note 2, § 1:2 ("[W]idespread... local recognition of how zoning may be utilized to fur-
ther perceived community interests . . . virtually guarantee[s] its continued use."); Policy
Guide on Smart Growth, AM. PLAN. ASS'N (Apr. 14, 2012), https://www.planning.org/policy
/guides/pdf/smartgrowth.pdf [http://perma.cc/X4Y3-BULP] (describing the consensus
among the professional planning community in support of "comprehensive planning" and
"legislation that promotes ... zoning and other land use regulations"). Even the rare places
without zoning see both land use planning and the enforcement of land use regulations as
important. Houston, the only major city without zoning (though it has other public land
use regulations, such as subdivision regulations and off-street parking requirements) has an
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planning allows for efficient use of infrastructure, aesthetically cohesive design,
community self-determination, and the reduction of local externalities. 3 ' Un-
der-enforcement also opens the door to a bait-and-switch with the public,
where governments trade promises that never materialize for popular support.
Limiting citizen enforcement is an understandable response to the threat of
over-enforcement in the land use context. Using zoning means that citizen
suits will be brought to try to block construction. A municipality hoping to
shepherd a desired development through the gauntlet of neighborhood opposi-
tion- as is often the case where covenants are used, 6- behaves sensibly in us-
ing private law to deny neighbors the power to enforce land use regulations.
But at the same time, denying citizens this power can lead to under-
enforcement. In the examples described above, citizens in New York lost their
affordable apartments when the City declined to enforce its covenant,137 and
citizens in Washington, D.C., lost the right to buy into their community.138
Those municipalities chose not to enforce even the most fundamental re-
strictions included in the covenants. As a result, the terms of the covenants may
have prevented obstructionist litigation, but they also left people without the
protections they were owed by developers.
As a policy matter, therefore, municipalities should relax, but not relin-
quish, their use of covenants to bar citizen enforcement of land use controls. To
the extent that local governments are limiting citizen enforcement in order to
ward off opportunistic litigation over minor design details or procedural irreg-
ularities, covenants offer a welcome tool for governments to fight back against
NIMBY-ism. But insofar as land use controls promote important public pur-
poses, strong citizen enforcement is an effective and important tool ensuring
those purposes are actually served. Committed community activists with valu-
able local knowledge should be empowered through citizen suits, even as anti-
development NIMBYs are defanged -the challenge is that these may be the
same people. Local governments, therefore, ought not use covenants to elimi-
nate citizen enforcement entirely. Rather, citizen enforcement of land use con-
active city planning department and expends public resources to enforce private land use
covenants under special statutory authorization. Siegan, supra note 38, at 71-77.
135. See sources cited supra note 134; see also ANDRrs DUANY & JEFF SPECK WITH MIKE LYDON,
THE SMART GROWTH MANUAL (2010) (laying out one leading vision of good urban plan-
ning, the New Urbanism, which is enforced by extensive zoning regulations); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 1o J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (1994) (defending
zoning from its critics).
136. See supra Part III.B.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 9o-92.
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trols should, to the extent possible, be restricted only as far as is necessary to
prevent obstructionism.
Luckily, covenants' private law nature offers the flexibility to perform the
necessary tailoring. Covenants' limits on citizen enforcement are just negotiat-
ed terms, and local governments can therefore simply stop including blanket
prohibitions on citizen enforcement in their covenants. There are many ways to
strike a better balance. Municipally imposed covenants ought to identify cer-
tain provisions that can be enforced by directly affected citizens. This kind of
tailoring would place enforcement powers in the hands of those intended to
derive benefit, ensuring that they receive the land use protections to which they
are entitled, while continuing to limit the enforcement powers of self-
appointed, obstructionist, anti-development neighbors. These enforcement
clauses could be carefully calibrated. A covenant to build a new elementary
school on site, for example, could be declared enforceable only by the local
PTA, or a covenant to provide affordable housing could be declared enforceable
only by tenants of the affordable units. In addition to identifying which citizens
are so directly affected that they ought to be given enforcement powers, cove-
nants could identify which of their provisions are appropriate for citizen en-
forcement. For example, the enforcement of procedural provisions, where vio-
lations may or may not meaningfully harm the public, might be reserved for
the government, which is better placed to use discretion in deciding whether to
bring an action, while substantive restrictions on development might be made
enforceable by citizens. Alternatively, local governments can (and sometimes
do) "'39 layer zoning and covenant-based land use restrictions on top of each
other. Citizen enforcement is thereby permitted for those terms placed in the
zoning code but not for those requirements placed in the covenant. This ap-
proach would not allow a city to designate certain directly affected groups as
the sole citizen enforcers but has the added benefit that citizens can easily iden-
tify the provisions they may enforce by looking at the zoning code. Under ei-
ther approach, covenants could still be used to limit NIMBY litigation while
ensuring that some land use controls will be enforced.
How broadly to allow citizen suits will depend on the particular context of
a project: how controversial it is, how litigious the opponents are, how robust
the government's enforcement program is, and the substance of the land use
restrictions. And who is directly affected will depend on the restriction in ques-
tion: while tenants are very directly benefitted by affordability requirements,
the beneficiaries of architectural design requirements, for example, are a harder
to define group. Nonetheless, for most projects, some balance ought to be
139. The New Haven Coliseum site redevelopment, see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text,
is an example of this strategy.
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struck between complete citizen enforcement and none at all. A middle path
between the all-or-nothing citizen enforcement regimes of public and private
land use law offers protection for development without sacrificing public ac-
countability.
IV. OTHER LEGAL DIFFERENCES: PARTICIPATION AND PERMANENCE
Of course, local governments choose covenants over zoning for more than a
single reason. This Note has emphasized enforcement because local govern-
ments consider enforcement to be a matter of central importance, as shown by
the close attention paid to it in the covenants put forward by municipalities.
Still, other legal differences between covenants and zoning may also drive gov-
ernments to choose one over the other. A local government's choice to use cov-
enants might be driven by something as contingent as which bureaucracy is
pushing a project. Further, where a local government is trying to block devel-
opment, covenants might be used to evade constitutional limitations on land
use regulation. More importantly, local governments might use covenants to
limit the amount of public participation in the planning process, just as they try
to limit public enforcement once a project is complete, or to provide land use
controls with a different form of permanence. Although this Note presents less
empirical evidence that local governments in fact choose covenants for these
reasons, these additional differences between zoning and covenants further
demonstrate that the two tools of land use regulation are legally distinct, not
just institutionally distinct.
At the most basic level, different agencies within a single administration
might control the zoning and covenanting processes. For example, it is com-
mon for a planning department to control zoning, while an economic devel-
opment agency controls public land disposition." ° For bureaucratic reasons,
each agency might first turn to the land use planning mechanism it controls.
Moreover, some local governments have independently elected zoning com-
missions,'4 ' which may have different policy preferences in addition to differ-
ent bureaucratic turf. On a case-by-case basis, these organizational divisions
may be important in determining whether zoning or covenants are used. How-
140. See Susan S. Fainstein, Promoting Economic Development: Urban Planning in the United States
and Great Britain, 57 J. AM. PLAN. AsS'N 22, 24 (1991) (comparing planners working in city
planning departments, who are responsible for zoning and related activities, with those in
mayors' offices and development corporations, whose work focuses on dealmaking).
141. See, e.g., Jason Bagley, Milford Dems Hold onto Majorities, Add One More, MILFORD PATCH
(Nov. 8, 2013, 12:54 A.M.), http://milford.patch.con/groups/elections/p/milford-dems
-hold-onto-majorities-add-one-more [http://perma.cc/D4C3-GCKK] (describing a switch
in partisan control of the Milford, Connecticut Planning and Zoning Board).
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ever, they do not provide a sufficient answer to the broader question. Where a
local government has made a certain project a top priority-as with the New
Haven Coliseum site discussed earlier4 - mayoral coordination is likely, ren-
dering bureaucratic turf wars less relevant. 43 Individual agencies also strategi-
cally choose between zoning and covenants to achieve their goals. In New York
City, for example, it was a single agency that added covenants to its previously
zoning-based system for creating privately operated public spaces.' Differ-
ences that are legal, and not just bureaucratic or institutional, drive these choic-
es to use covenants or zoning.
Similarly, local governments likely sometimes use covenants to evade con-
stitutional limits on regulation, in particular federal and state takings clauses.
In the specific case of conservation easements, for example, where a covenant
might prohibit all significant development in perpetuity, a government could
not constitutionally achieve the same result by regulation without paying just
compensation. 4s When local governments are attempting to limit development
significantly, therefore, they have a strong incentive to use covenants, if possi-
ble, to avoid takings issues.' 46 Relatedly, most zoning codes avoid imposing
regulatory takings by allowing landowners to receive variances- exemptions or
permitted deviations from the applicable zoning requirements -when zoning
proves to be a hardship. 47 The variance process thereby limits, to some extent,
local governments' ability to impose unusually harsh land use restrictions. In
contrast, hardships only lead to loosened restrictions in covenants in limited
circumstances. When imposing onerous land use restrictions, therefore, gov-
ernments have reason to disfavor zoning: the covenant is more likely to stick.
But as with bureaucratic explanations, these constitutional issues are insuffi-
142. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
143. See Mayor, Office of the (OTM), N.Y.C. DEP'T CITYWIDE ADMIN. SERV., http://a856
-gbol.nyc.gov/gbolwebsite/39o.htm [http://perma.cc/D7T7-JD2R] (defining one role of
the mayor's office as coordinating among city agencies).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 69-77.
145. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 23, at 820.
146. If the covenant were imposed through negotiations over a discretionary land use approval, it
would still be subject to Nollan and Dolan exactions scrutiny, though not directly as a regu-
latory taking. See supra note 58. If the covenant were imposed while the local government
was acting directly as a landowner, there should be no more a takings issue than if a private
landowner did the same.
147. See Jonathan E. Cohen, Comment, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and
Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 307, 330 (1995).
148. Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in
Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REv. 433, 486-88 (1984) (describing the rela-
tive hardship doctrine in covenant law, which is at times narrowly construed, and noting
that it is typically only applied if there are other factors permitting the lifting of covenants).
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cient to explain most choices to use covenants. Regulatory takings and vari-
ances are concerns where the government is trying to stifle growth, but munic-
ipalities generally use covenants to govern projects that they hope to help move
forward. "9 To the extent that a local government is promoting a development
and giving the developer what it needs to succeed and profit, land use regula-
tions are extremely unlikely to fail the Penn Central balancing test for regulato-
ry takings. ° For these favored projects where covenants are commonly used,
governments' choices to do so are much better explained by a desire to limit
citizen enforcement, which can be a costly impediment to development.
Two additional factors, however, may drive municipalities to use covenants
to regulate land use rather than zoning. First, using covenants may allow a lo-
cal government to limit public participation in the planning process. The de-
gree of public participation is not inherent to the legal forms: regulatory deci-
sions can be made in backroom deals,'' and municipalities may seek out broad
public input in designing covenants." 2 Nevertheless, the Standard Zoning En-
abling Act, which was broadly adopted across the country and governs the ex-
ercise of most local zoning powers,' requires a public hearing before zoning
regulations may be enacted.5 4 In contrast, statutes authorizing local govern-
ments to convey real property - one important source of local governments'
power to impose covenants -generally do not include such hearing require-
ments.' Accordingly, the zoning process is more likely to include broad public
149. The New Haven Coliseum site redevelopment, see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text,
is typical in this respect, as is the Riverside South project, see supra Part III.B.
1So. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
ipi. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 135, at 87 n.157 (noting that, of eighteen Chicago aldermen
arrested for corruption in a twenty-year period, seven were convicted for bribery in connec-
tion with zoning).
1S2. See, e.g., Jack Encarnacao, Quincy Residents Call for Fast Track on $1.3B Downtown Makeover,
PATRIOT LEDGER, Nov. 23, 20o, http://www.patriotledger.com/x6562o339 9 /Quincy
-residents-call-for-fast-track-on-1-3B-downtown-makeover [http://perma.cc/K995-7WBU ]
(describing a public meeting with over oo people in attendance for a downtown redevel-
opment project governed by a land disposition agreement).
153. ELLICKSON &BEEN, supra note 23, at 74-76.
154. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENA-
BLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS 7 n.27 (rev.
ed. 1926).
155. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-76-2 (2014) (requiring public notice but no public hearing
for the sale or lease of public property).
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participation than would a covenant negotiation. Indeed, participatory demo-
cratic values often trump legalistic ones in the zoning process." 6
For local governments, public participation in the land use process is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, public participation allows govern-
ments to harness local information at the neighborhood level- information
that may be impossible for a centralized bureaucracy to gather or process on its
own.157 On the other hand, homeowners resistant to any change in their neigh-
borhood- even changes unlikely to have any negative effect,8 - routinely dom-
inate public hearings and are often successful in demonstrating enough opposi-
tion to defeat unwanted projects. 9 From this perspective, public participation
provides both an opportunity for better development and for unrepresentative
obstructionism.
Where a government wants a project to succeed, therefore, the participa-
tory nature of the zoning process may push a local government to use cove-
nants to regulate land use. The century-long debate over whether more or less
public participation is a good thing for land use planning is beyond the scope
of this Note.16 ° Suffice it to say that the turn to covenant-based regulation re-
flects municipal attempts to limit the power of citizens in development politics
in two different ways. As public law, zoning brings citizens into the land use
process at both the planning stage, through hearings and other participatory
mechanisms, and at the enforcement stage, through citizen suits for aggrieved
156. See generally Eric H. Steele, Participation and Rules-The Functions of Zoning, 11 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 709 (1986) (describing why the zoning process is better understood as pro-
moting participatory political processes than as enforcing substantive rules).
157. See Community-Based Planning, N.Y.C. DEP'T CITY PLAN., http://www.nyc.gov/html
/dcp/htmVcommunity-planning/index.shtml [http://perma.cc/N7R7-PZ2X] ("People who
are close to neighborhood issues can clearly identify community needs and advocate pas-
sionately for local concerns."). See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
158. See William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144 (2001) (showing how
neighbors fight against any risk of reduced home prices even when it is unlikely that home
prices would actually fall).
159. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE Hous., U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEv., "NOT IN MY BACKYARD": REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE Hous-
ING 1-8 (1991) ("NIMBY groups.., can be very effective at packing hearing rooms and leav-
ing the impression that public opinion is strongly against whatever project they oppose.");
LELAND WARE & STEVEN W. PEUQUET, DELAWARE ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR Hous-
ING CHOICE 83 (2003) ("After a flood of angry letters and phone calls and a few emotionally
charged public hearings, the zoning boards will yield to the demands of residents.").
16o. See Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Com-
munity Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 866-92 (2oo1) (tracing
the "ebb and flow" of the federal government's efforts to promote public participation in
urban redevelopment programs).
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neighbors. As private law, covenants can be used to push citizens out of the
land use process at each of those stages. Covenants give governments the ca-
pacity to calibrate the balance of power between citizens and public officials
over the entire lifetime of a development project.
A second difference between zoning and covenants is their permanence.
Although less present than enforcement concerns in the text of government
imposed covenants or the case law concerning them, permanence is a deep doc-
trinal distinction. On the one hand, statutes can last forever. Unless repealed, a
zoning ordinance will remain binding in perpetuity, since courts generally can-
not sunset outdated laws. 6 ' In contrast, most covenants will prove less long-
lasting. First, courts are less likely to treat a covenant that does not sunset as
running with the land, meaning that as property changes hands over time, cov-
enants made in perpetuity may become unenforceable. 62 Second, courts will
not enforce a covenant if changed conditions have rendered it obsolete. 6 Zon-
ing, therefore, is potentially a much longer-lasting restriction on development.
Then again, a zoning ordinance is far easier to amend than a covenant, giv-
ing covenants a different kind of permanence.' 6' The local government may
unilaterally rezone land, while the renegotiation of a covenant requires the con-
sent of all parties. 6' A subsequent rezoning will not affect a developer that has
vested its rights, for example by obtaining building permits or starting con-
struction, 166 but zoning still creates more regulatory risk for the landowner
than does a covenant-based system of land use controls. Given the value of cer-
tainty and predictability in real estate development, developers may demand
covenants, rather than zoning regulations, and local governments may want to
give them that certainty.
These issues of permanence implicate deep institutional questions: when
should political change be allowed to affect deals struck by a previous admin-
istration? What is the relative competence of legislatures and judges in deter-
16i. Cf. GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing that
courts should be allowed to determine whether a statute is obsolete).
162. See Eagle Enters., Inc. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 86, 819 (N.Y. 1976).
163. See Bolotin v. Rindge, 230 Cal. App. zd 74 1, 743 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
164. French, supra note 24, at 1263 n.6. ("Because zoning ordinances and other governmental
controls are usually much more susceptible to change as the result of political and economic
pressures than are real covenants and equitable servitudes, one function served by private
land use arrangements is to protect against uncertainty of governmental land use regula-
tion.").
165. See Fennell, supra note 24, at 893-94 ("It has never been easier to bind oneself and one's suc-
cessors to a covenant that benefits hundreds or even thousands of other landowners, and it
has never been easier for those numerous other landowners to hold one to the covenant.").
166. See I ZIEGLER, supra note 2, § 70.
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mining when a land use restriction is obsolete? Given the stakes of these issues,
permanence and amendment likely affect the municipal choice of land use con-
trol. These questions of who controls land use policy, present or future offi-
cials, also intersect with the existing scholarship on zoning and covenants. As
discussed earlier, this scholarship focuses on who enacts each form of regula-
tion but only examines the issue at a particular moment in time. '6 7 Further in-
quiry into the differences between covenants and zoning, and particularly gov-
ernmental use of covenants, should examine how questions of permanence af-
affect municipal decision making and how they interact with the enforcement
concerns identified in this Note.
CONCLUSION
Although covenants are most commonly used as land use controls by pri-
vate parties, municipal governments routinely supplement their zoning power
with covenants. Covenants are not merely the private equivalent of zoning,
therefore, but also a meaningfully different legal tool. The difference between
the two forms of regulation does not lie in the substantive restrictions each can
contain. Zoning is now sufficiently flexible and discretionary that it can impose
the same substantive limits on development that covenants can. Rather, a pri-
mary distinction between zoning and covenants is the nature of the party em-
powered to enforce them. Zoning ordinances are broadly enforceable by ag-
grieved citizens. In contrast, local governments use covenants to limit citizen
enforcement and reserve enforcement power for themselves, with the goal of
protecting development from litigious neighbors. By using covenants, local
governments can avoid public law norms of participation and accountability,
and they can opt into a private law system where everything, including en-
forcement regimes, can be customized. While the ability to limit enforcement
of covenants is not the only distinction between the two forms of land use con-
trol- in particular, zoning tends to allow for greater public participation and
different forms of amendment -it is one that local governments actively em-
brace. In this way, covenants are not merely the equivalent of zoning for pri-
vate parties. Their private law origins remain doctrinally and practically signifi-
cant.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
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